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DISCRIMINATORY SPEECH AND THE TORT OF
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
JEAN C. LovE*

I.

SECTION

6-103 OF

TME MODEL ComMUmCATIVE

TORTS ACT

Section 6-103 of the Model Communicative Torts Act (Model Act)
recognizes a tort action whenever a person "intentionally engages in a course
of conduct (i.e., "a pattern of communication evincing a continuity of
purpose") that is addressed to an individual, that is specifically intended
and reasonably likely to harass or intimidate the individual because of the
individual's race, sex, [ethnic origin], or religion, and that directly causes
serious emotional distress."' The Model Act provides two remedies for such
tortious conduct: injunctive relief and damages for proven losses, including

pecuniary loss and emotional distress. 2 The comment to Section 6-103 states
that the Section is "bracketed" to indicate "divisions of opinion" among
the drafters as to "whether freedom from harassment based on an individual's race, sex, ethnic origin, or religion is an interest that the drafters
' 3
wished to protect in the context of tort liability based on communication.
To understand the "divisions of opinion" among the drafters, one must
understand the evolution of the Section. Originally, the drafters of the

Model Act abolished the common-law actions for intentional, reckless, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress whenever the defendant had inflicted such harm through "pure speech" (as opposed to "pure conduct"
or "speech plus conduct"). 4 Although the drafters never explained exactly

*

Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1968, University

of Wisconsin.
I. MODEL COMMUNICATIVE TORTS ACT § 6-103 (1989) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. The
original inspiration for § 6-103 came from Professor Delgado's article, which recommends the
recognition of a tort action for racial insult, provided the plaintiff proves:
Language was addressed to him or her by the defendant that was intended to demean
through reference to race; that the plaintiff understood as intended to demean
through reference to race; and that a reasonable person would recognize as a racial
insult.
Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling,
17 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 179 (1982) [hereinafter Words That Wound].
2. The remedies for a violation of § 6-103 are set forth in §§ 9-101, 9-102, and 9-108
of the Model Act.
3. MODEL ACT § 6-103 comment. Professor Delgado's proposal was as controversial as
§ 6-103. See also Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words That Wound," 18 HAgv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 585 (1983); Delgado, ProfessorDelgado Replies, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Ray. 593 (1983).
4. Section 2-101 of the Model Act abolished the emotional distress actions for "pure
speech." Section 2-101 of the Model Act provides:
There shall be no liability in tort for injuries caused by communication except as
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why they chose to eradicate emotional distress actions, the drafters did write
a "Prefatory Note" to the Model Act, stating that the Act is designed to
"consolidate the sources of tort liability." 5 Presumably, the drafters were
concerned about the overlap between the dignitary torts of defamation,
invasion of privacy, and infliction of emotional distress. 6 In particular, the
drafters probably were worried about those plaintiffs who bring claims for
infliction of emotional distress in an effort to avoid the constitutionally
imposed restrictions on the law of defamation. 7 To preclude such plaintiffs
from joining emotional distress and defamation claims, the drafters abolished all emotional distress actions.
After the drafters of the Model Act had "consolidated" the sources of

liability for tortious speech by eliminating emotional distress claims, they
realized that they had eradicated the only tort action that could provide

vindication for the victims of racist and sexist speech. By a divided vote,
the drafters then added Section 6-103 to the Act.8 Generally speaking, the

Section restores the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in
cases where a defendant has harassed or intimidated a plaintiff on the basis
of race, sex, ethnicity, or religion. 9 The comment to Section 6-103 indicates
that the purpose of the Section is to "provide recovery for injury to the

emotional well-being of individuals who are the victims of intentional,
personalized harassment."' 10 The Section protects the interests of "dignity"
and "self-respect."" It reflects the policy that "members of groups that
traditionally have been ... discriminated against should be protected in

provided in this [Act]; however, this [Act] shall not affect:
a) liability explicitly imposed notwithstanding this [Act] by a statute or regulation
of this State;...
c) liability for conduct that is related to or part of a communication to the extent
that liability would apply to the conduct absent the communication....
In essence, the Section abolishes any action for tortious "speech" unless such action is
authorized by the Model Act. By contrast, the Section preserves liability for tortious "speech
plus conduct." The comment to § 2-101 offers the following illustration of how a "speech
plus conduct" case would be resolved under the Model Act:
Many communications have potentially actionable conduct associated with them. For
example, if X paints a statement on Y's house without Y's permission, X has made
a communication and has damaged Y's property. X's liability for the communication
depends on the availability of relief under the Act. Even if relief is not available
under the Act, however, liability for the property damage would remain available if
provided by the laws of a State.
Because the Model Act, as originally conceived, contained no authorization of any action for
the infliction of emotional distress, all such actions for purely tortious speech were abolished.
Only emotional distress actions for "speech plus conduct" were preserved.
5. MODEL ACT, Prefatory Note.
6. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
7.Id.
8. See supra text accompanying note 3.
9.See supra text accompanying note 1.
10. MODEL ACT § 6-103 comment.
11. Id.
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tort from harassment" based on their membership in such groups.12
The earliest version of Section 6-103 would have allowed recovery for
isolated "slurs" (i.e., single incidents of discriminatory speech). 3 But, due
to opposition from a majority of the students involved in the drafting

process, the original version was amended to require a "pattern of communication evincing a continuity of purpose."' 14 The amendment was added
"as a compromise so that the Section would not be eliminated entirely.", 5
Presumably, the proponents of the "pattern of communication" language
believed that such a restriction on liability was necessary to accommodate
first amendment concerns. 6 So justified, the restriction reflects one of the
overall purposes of the Model Act: "to strike a balance within the torts
themselves that reflects the needed attention to first amendmefit concerns."' 7
II.

IMPACT OF THE MODEL ACT ON TORT ACTIONS BY VICTIMS OF

DIscRIMINATORY SPEECH

If a legislature were contemplating the adoption of the Model Com-

municative Torts Act, it would want to know what impact Section 6-103
would have on existing tort law. Therefore, in this Part, I describe the
reported cases in which plaintiffs have sought to impose tort liability for
discriminatory speech. I focus on two questions: 1) Have the courts au-

thorized intentional infliction of emotional distress actions against defendants who, by "pure speech,"'" have harassed or intimidated a plaintiff on
the basis of race, sex, ethnicity, religion, or some other group characteristic?
2) If such recovery has been allowed, did the plaintiff have to prove that
the defendant engaged in a "pattern of communication evincing a continuity
of purpose"?
My methodology in this Part will be to tell the stories of the plaintiffs

in the reported cases in considerable detail.' 9 One of my objectives is to
12. Id.
13. Letter of January 15, 1990, from Jill S. Talbot, the student primarily responsible
for drafting § 6-103 of the Model Act, to Jean C. Love (on file with author). "
14. See supra text accompanying note 1. A "pattern of communication" was understood
by the drafters to mean "multiple incidents" of verbal harassment and not just the repetition
of abusive epithets during a "single incident." Telephone conversation on October 30, 1989,
with Jill S. Talbot, the student primarily responsible for drafting § 6-103 of the Model Act.
15. Letter of January 15, 1990, from Jill S. Talbot to Jean C. Love (on file with author).
16. MODEL AcT, Prefatory Note.
17. Id.
18. I will consider only those cases in which the defendant discriminated by means of
"pure speech." I will not discuss the cases in which the defendant discriminated by means of
"speech plus conduct," as when the defendant simultaneously uttered racial or ethnic epithets
and fired the plaintiff. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 88, 468 P.2d 216,
86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970); Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 228
Cal. Rptr. 591 (1986); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173
(1977). For a discussion of the Model Act's distinction between "pure speech" cases and
"speech plus conduct" cases, see supra note 4.
19. See generally Legal Storytelling, 87 MIcH. L. RPv. 2073 (1989) (symposium that
contains several articles on storytelling from minority perspectives).
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answer the two questions posed in the preceding paragraph. My other
objective is to provide an opportunity for all of us to hear the hurt in the
voices of the victims of discriminatory speech. Only by listening to their
20
stories can we begin to develop empathy for the nature of their harms.
If you are a reader who is not familiar with the historical development
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, let me take this
opportunity to give you a thumbnail sketch of the evolution of the cause
of action. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was
proposed first in the 1930s 21 and was incorporated into the Restatement of
Torts in 1948.22 Prior to the 1930s and 1940s, a person could sue only for
an insult to personal dignity by bringing an action for assault, battery,
trespass, or defamation.23 The courts adhered to the old proverb: "Sticks
and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me." 24 In 1948
the American Law Institute adopted the following proposition as Section
46: "One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe
emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such emotional distress and

(b) for bodily harm resulting from

it.

''

25

Ten years later, Professor Prosser, as the Reporter for the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, announced that there were over one hundred cases
dealing with the question of liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 26 Professor Prosser redrafted Section 46 "to keep the courts from
running wild on this thing" and added numerous comments designed to
"spell out some boundaries, qualifications and limitations" to the new
tort. 27 As a result, Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes
20. See generally Getman, Colloquy: Human Voice in Legal Discourse, 66 TEx. L. REv.
577 (1988); Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987); Henderson,
The Dialogue of Heart and Head, 10 CARDozo L. Rv. 123 (1988); Massaro, Empathy, Legal
Storytelling and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87 Micn. L. REv. 2099 (1989).
21. For a discussion of the development of the tort, see Chamallas & Kerber, Women,
Mothers and the Law of Fright:A History (forthcoming); Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbancein the Law of Torts, 49 HAiv. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Pedrick, IntentionalInfliction:
Should Section 46 Be Revised?, 13 PEPPERDINmE L. REv. 1 (1985); Prosser, IntentionalInfliction
of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MIcH. L. REv. 874 (1939); Prosser, Insult and Outrage,
44 CALrF. L. REv. 40 (1956); Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4
VAND. L. REv. 63 (1951).
22. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948).
23. See, e.g., Bouillon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 148 Mo. App. 462, 129 S.W. 401 (1910)
(action for trespass; pregnant plaintiff who experienced fright that caused miscarriage allowed
to recover special compensatory damages for emotional distress). See generally Wade, Tort
Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REv. 63 (1950).
24. Wade, supra note 23, at 63.
25. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948). For a description of the American Law
Institute's cursory discussion of § 46, see Pedrick, Intentional Infliction: Should Section 46
Be Revised?, 13 PEPaERDm L. REv. 1, 3-4 & n.7 (1985).
26. Id. at 4 n.10.
27. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948). The 1948 version required only that the
conduct causing the distress be intentional. Id. It was not until a 1957 revision that extreme
and outrageous conduct became an element of the tort. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
46 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957). See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEaTON, & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 12, at 64 & n.94 (5th ed. 1984).
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liability for damages on a defendant who "by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another. . ."7 The comment that defines "extreme and outrageous conduct"
narrowly circumscribes a defendant's liability for the use of abusive language:
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. The
rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing
down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected
and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language,
and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.
There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where
some one's feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express
an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through
which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam. See
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
47 Harvard Law Review 1033, 1053 (1936). It is only where there
is a special relation between the parties, as stated in § 48, that there
may be recovery for insults not amounting to extreme outrage. 29
The feared flood of litigation under Section 46 never materialized. 0 In the
last ten years, there have been approximately 600 reported cases citing the
Section.3 That figure averages out to sixty reported cases per year or slightly
32
more than one case per state each year.
"Pure speech" cases constitute a very small percentage of the total
cases decided under Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Most
of the litigation has involved allegations of "speech plus conduct" or "pure
conduct." 33 Not surprisingly, then, most of the cases in which the courts
have imposed tort liability for racial or sexual harassment have been "speech
plus conduct" cases.3 4 For example, a "colored" wife of a dental surgeon

28. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). The drafters of the Restatement
included a separate provision governing the infliction of emotional distress by common carriers:
"A common carrier or other public utility is subject to liability to patrons utilizing its facilities
for gross insults which reasonably offend them, inflicted by the utility's servants while otherwise
acting within the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48 (1965).
Section 48 governs actions for racial, ethnic, sexual, or religious epithets uttered by common
carriers, owners of hotels and motels, and possibly by owners of businesses open to the public.

Id.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
30. Pedrick, supra note 25, at 6-7 (reporting that, as of 1985, § 46 had been cited in
556 reported cases since 1948).

31. Acosta, The Tort of "Outrageous Conduct" in New Mexico: Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Harm without Physical Injury, 19 N. MEx. L. Rav. 425, 434 (1989).
32. Id. at 434-35.
33. Id. at 439-45 (describing wide array of intentional infliction of emotional distress
cases).
34. For a discussion of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:123

was denied service by the Slenderella Salon and told: "We have never
served anybody but Caucasians and I just know you won't be happy here. ' 3
A "Negro" truck driver was called a "nigger" by his foreman and fired
from his job.3 6 A black man was called a "nigger" and told to get his
"black ass" out of the defendant's auto parts store, and denied service. 7
A Mexican-American employee was subjected to "repeated racial jokes,
slurs and comments" before he was wrongfully discharged." A female
employee was told by her supervisor that he wanted to have sex with her,
and then he brushed up against her, rubbing his penis against her buttocks.3 9
Another female employee, a legal clerk in the litigation department of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, was verbally pressured by her
boss for sexual relations and touched in a sexual manner while on the job.4
When she refused to comply with his demands, he retaliated by giving her
4
extra work and unfavorable work evaluations.
A.

Racial Harassment

The first case in which a plaintiff sued a defendant for purely racist
speech on a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress was Wiggs
v. Courshon.42 A black family went to a restaurant for dinner while on
vacation. The family consisted of Joe Wiggs (a lawyer), Barbara Wiggs (a
lawyer), Kevin Wiggs (their seven year old son), plus Arthur and Miriam
Bracey (Barbara's parents). The family members were celebrating Joe Wiggs'
graduation from law school and sitting for the bar exam. The family was
in a motel restaurant in Miami Beach, Florida, on their way back to their
home in Virginia. Joe Wiggs ordered the fisherman's platter for the entire
family. Before ordering he asked the waitress to check the ingredients, and
she told him that it included shrimps, fish fillet, and scallops. 43 When the
dinner order arrived, Joe Wiggs questioned why the scallops were missing

context of racial and sexual harassment, see Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and
the Tort of IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress,41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988); Richardson,
Racism: A Tort of Outrage, 61 ORE. L. REv. 267 (1982); Comment, The Harms of Asking:
Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. Cni. L. Rav. 328 (1988);
Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA.
L. REv. 1461 (1986).
35. Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 54 Wash. 2d 440, 442, 341 P.2d 859, 861 (1959).
36. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 479, 468 P.2d 216, 217, 86 Cal. Rptr.
88, 89 (1970).
37. Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 318 N.W.2d 558 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
38. Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977).
39. Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116 (1986).
40. Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1982).
41. Id. at 893.
42. 355 F. Supp. 206 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (plaintiff originally sued for assault; court decided
to instruct jury on intentional infliction of emotional distress theory under RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) oF TORTS § 48 (1965) and allowed plaintiffs to amend pleadings to conform with
proof).
43. Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206, 207 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
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and told the waitress that he would not have ordered the platter had she
told him that the restaurant was out of scallops. The waitress exclaimed:
44
"You can't talk to me like that, you black son-of-a-bitch. I will kill you."
The waitress then turned away and stood motionless for five to ten seconds
as she realized that she had violated company policy. 45 Another waitress
escorted her to the kitchen, where she shouted repeatedly: "[T]hey are
nothing but a bunch of niggers." 46 The plaintiffs left the dining room and
complained to the manager. The manager subsequently did not charge the
Wiggs for the meal. The plaintiffs checked out of the motel, went to lodging
nearby, and left town the next day, cutting their vacation short by two
days.47 Kevin repeatedly asked questions about the incident. He had been
taught not to use the profanity that the waitress had directed at his father,
and he had witnessed the waitress humiliate his father in a setting where
' 4
his father "was not free to 'strike back. ' 8
All five family members sued for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 49 A jury composed of three blacks and three whites (four women
and two men) returned a verdict of "no damages" for Barbara Wiggs and
her parents, 0 $5,000 compensatory damages and $10,000 punitive damages
in favor of Joe Wiggs,51 and $1,000 compensatory and $9,000 punitive
damages in favor of Kevin.1 2 The trial court judge, however, ruled that the
verdicts in favor of Joe and Kevin "shocked" the judicial conscience and
granted defendant's motion for a new trial unless the plaintiffs stipulated
to a reduction in the total amount of the verdicts from $25,000 to $2,500.11
The trial court judge offered the following explanation of his decision to
order a remittitur:
We all have ethnic and racial backgrounds and the court notes that
there is at least one and usually several epithets ascribed to any
ethnic group .... [If the court were to affirm the jury's verdict in
this caseJ a line would quickly form by members of any ethnic
group to receive $25,000 as balm for an ethnic or racial epithet.

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 208.
Id. at 208-09. She was discharged the next day. Id. at 209 n.2.
Id. at 208.
Id.

48. Id.at 208 n.l.
49. Id.at 207.
50. Id.at 210. The court observed that the jury verdicts in favor of these three plaintiffs
for "no damages" compelled the conclusion that the damages awarded to the other two
plaintiffs resulted from the insult at the table. Id. at 208.
51. Id. at 210. Presumably, Joe Wiggs received the highest verdict because he was the
target of the insult at the table.
52. Id. Presumably, Kevin Wiggs received damages, whereas the adults sitting at the
table did not because he was "less accustomed" to such language. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
oF TORTS § 48 illustration 5 (1965) (child who overheard profane language in waiting room of
train station could recover damages against railroad; her father could not).
53. Wiggs, 355 F. Supp. at 211. Joe Wiggs was to receive 15/25 of the $2,500; Kevin
Wiggs was to receive 10/25 of the reduced verdict.
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The indefensibility of the size of the verdict is plainer still when we
place it in context of an epithet delivered in a dispute over the
ingredients of a dinner entree when that remark caused neither outof-pocket expenses to the members of the ethnic group nor any
54
apparent mental or emotional injury.
The other case in which a black plaintiff adequately stated a cause of
action for purely verbal abuse is Bailey v. Binyon.5 5 A black man who was
employed as a cook in a Chicago restaurant went to work early one morning.
The boss told the cook that he was dissatisfied with the soups and sauces
that had been prepared the day before.5 6 When the cook responded that he
was not responsible for preparing the soups and sauces, his boss stated:
"[A]ll you niggers are alike. ' 57 The cook kept on walking toward the
kitchen, and the boss followed him, calling the cook a "nigger. ' 58 The
black cook told his boss that he objected to the racial epithets and wanted
to be treated "like a human being."' 59 The boss replied: "You're not a
human being, you're a nigger." 6 At that point the cook left the restaurant
and never returned. 61 His boss called out after him: "[Y]ou'd stay if you
weren't a sissy. If you were a man, you'd stay." 62 The trial court denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. 6 Although the
case involved an "isolated" incident of racial discrimination, the trial court
ruled that the plaintiff could proceed with his cause of action.r 4
Thus, Wiggs and Bailey authorize juries to find that the utterance of
racial epithets constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct. Early in the
development of the law regarding racial harassment, defendants contended
that the use of the slang epithet "nigger" should not be considered extreme
and outrageous conduct because it was a matter of "common usage," along
with such other racial characterizations as "chink" or "jap. ' 65 The courts
rejected the argument, holding that racial epithets had become "particularly
abusive and insulting in light of recent developments in the civil rights

54. Id.

55. 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill.
1984). Bailey was an action for emotional distress
damages that was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. I have included it here because the court
draws heavily on intentional infliction of emotional distress cases in deciding to allow recovery
under § 1981. Id.at 931.
56. Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 924-25 (W.D. Ill. 1984).
57. Id.at 925.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.

61. Id.at 925.
62. Id.Four other employees were in the restaurant when the plaintiff refused to stay.
There is no indication as to whether the employees would have been more likely to support
the plaintiff or the defendant if the plaintiff had chosen to stay.
63. Id.at 934.
64. Id. at 928-31 (plaintiff constructively was discharged due to "aggravated" nature of

situation).
65. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
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movement. . ."66 More recently, the defendant in Bailey contended that
".

his remarks were "mere insults," and thus not actionable. But the court
ruled that the defendant's distinction between "human beings" and "nig-67
gers" was so despicable that it rose well above the level of a "mere insult."
The court emphasized that "such comments 'are different qualitatively [from
mere insults] because they
conjure up the entire history of racial discrimi' 6
nation in this country." ' 9
It is also obvious after reading Wiggs and Bailey that current tort law
does not require proof of a "pattern of communication" in cases of racial
harassment. 69 The plaintiffs in Wiggs were allowed to recover damages for
a single outburst by the waitress,70 and the jury in Bailey was allowed to
impose liability for the defendant's repeated utterance of a single racial
epithet during a single moment in time. 7' Thus, the courts have taken the
position that isolated utterances of racial epithets are sufficiently demeaning
to warrant the imposition of tort liability. The Model Act, by contrast,
would preclude the plaintiffs in Wiggs and Bailey from recovering damages
on the theory that they were not the victims of72 a "pattern of communication
evincing a continuity of purpose" to harass.
If tort liability may be imposed for isolated utterances of racial epithets,
does that mean that liability must be imposed for every racial insult? Courts
have refused to so hold.7 3 Instead, courts have examined each racially biased
statement in context. Damages have been denied in certain circumstances.
For example, in Bradshaw v. Swagerty7 4 the defendant, a lawyer, was hired
to collect an account owed by the plaintiff, a young black man. The plaintiff
appeared in the defendant's office, asserted the defense of infancy regarding
his debt and "helped himself to candy from a dish. .

.,

much to defendant's

irritation. ' 75 The discussion grew heated, and the defendant allegedly called
the plaintiff a "nigger," a "bastard," and a "knot-headed boy. ' 76 The
court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that the
epithets were 'mere insults' of the kind which must be tolerated in our
rough-edged society." 77 No doubt, the Bradshaw court was influenced by

66. Alcorn, 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498 n.4, 468 P.2d at 219 n.4, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 91 n.4. See
also Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1979).
67. Bailey, 583 F. Supp. at 930.
68. Id. at 934.
69. See supra text accompanying note 1.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 51-53.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60, 63-64.
72. See supra text accompanying note 1.
73. Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1130 n.19, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 591, 605 n.19 (1986) (jury may determine whether supervisor engaged in extreme and
outrageous conduct when she stated that "black people in general don't like to work" and,
therefore, plaintiff was "faking" back injury to avoid work).
74. 1 Kan. App. 2d 213, 563 P.2d 511 (1977).
75. Id. at 214, 563 P.2d at 513.
76. Id.

77. Id.at 216, 563 P.2d at 514.
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the fact that the defendant was acting in the role of a debt collector. It is
generally understood that creditors may speak harshly to debtors who refuse
to make payments. 78 In fact, the Restatement (Second) of Torts specifically
provides that, if a creditor calls a debtor a "deadbeat," such a "rude and
insolent" statement does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous
conduct.

79

Another type of situation in which the courts have refused to impose
liability for racial epithets is a heated argument between a sales clerk and
a customer. In Dawson v. Zayre Department Stores0 the court dismissed
the complaint of a black woman who alleged that the defendant's sales
clerk had called her a "nigger" in a dispute over a lay-away ticket.8 1 The
court refused to condone "the derogatory and offensive language," but
believed that, under the circumstances, it amounted to no more than
"insulting namecalling from which no recovery may be made." '82 The court
specifically ruled that the law "does not invoke liability in a situation where,
without other aggravating circumstances, one hurls an epithet at another
during the course of a disagreement." 3
B. Ethnic Harassment
There are two cases in which the courts have held that plaintiffs who were
the victims of ethnic slurs could go to trial on their causes of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 4 In Gomez v. Hug"5 the plaintiff,
a Mexican-American, was employed as a supervisor at the county fairgrounds in Topeka, Kansas. The plaintiff went with his immediate supervisor, the fairgrounds administrator, to the administrator's office to make
a phone call. The defendant, a white man who was a member of the Board
of County Commissioners, was already in the administrator's office when
the plaintiff and the administrator entered the office.8 6 The defendant asked
the administrator: "What is that fucking spic doing in the office?" '8 7 The
defendant ordered the plaintiff to step toward him and again referred to

78. For a discussion of the law governing debt collectors, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 comment e (1965).
79. Id. illustration 8. See also Breeden v. League Serv. Corp., 575 P.2d 1374 (Okla.
1978) (summary judgment for defendant collection agency who called plaintiff debtor "deadbeat" and "God damned liar").
80. 346 Pa. Super. 357, 499 A.2d 648 (1985).
81. Id. at 359, 499 A.2d at 648. Accord Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc., 46 Ill.
App. 3d
162, 360 N.E.2d 983 (1977) (complaint dismissed).
82. Dawson, 346 Pa. Super. at 360, 499 A.2d at 649.
83. Id. at 361-62, 499 A.2d at 650.
84. Gomez v. Hug, 7 Kan. App. 2d 603, 645 P.2d 916 (1982) (summary judgment for
defendant reversed); Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1981) (summary
judgment for defendant reversed).
85. 7 Kan. App. 2d 603, 645 P.2d 916 (1982).
86. Id. at 603, 645 P.2d at 916.
87. Id. at 604, 645 P.2d at 918.
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the plaintiff as a "fucking spic." 88 The plaintiff moved toward the defendant
and asked him what he meant by that name. The defendant responded: "A
fucking Mexican greaser like you, that is all you are. You are nothing but
a fucking Mexican greaser, nothing but a pile of shit." '8 9 When the plaintiff
stood silently in front of the defendant, the defendant said: "Are you going
to do something, you coward, you greaser, you fucking spic? What are you
going to do? Don't stand there like a damn fool. . ...90
For five to fifteen minutes, the defendant repeatedly raised his fist and
pounded the table as he spoke. The plaintiff "froze" because he was
"afraid" of the defendant, 9' particularly because the defendant had made
similar remarks during the previous day or two. 92 In the words of the
plaintiff: "For the first time in my life, I was terrified of one man calling
me that. I was afraid for my job. I was afraid for my family." 93 After the
defendant stopped shouting, the administrator escorted the plaintiff from
his office and took him home. The plaintiff began having serious medical
problems, and he was hospitalized three months later. Seven months after
94
the incident, the plaintiff resigned his job with the county.
The defendant argued that the racial epithets were "mere insults." 9
The trial court agreed and held that the racial remarks were not actionable
as a matter of law. 96 The appellate court reversed and held that "this
vituperation was well beyond the bounds of freedom to blow off harmless
steam. ' 9 7 The court justified its decision in the following language:
It is not a burden of American citizenship in the State of Kansas
that such vitriolic bullying as was turned by Hug against Gomez,
and its emotional and physical consequences, must be accepted
without possibility of redress and accepted as often as it amuses
the speaker to utter it. Kansas courts are not so impotent. At the
very least the victim of such an attack has the right to have his
grievance heard by a jury of average members of the community
to know whether they would exclaim, "Outrageous! " 98
Under Section 6-103 of the Model Act, Gomez might be able to bring
a cause of action against Hug, but not for the reasons given by the Kansas
appellate court. Rather, Gomez would have standing to sue Hug under the

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.The court's opinion provides no facts as to what was said or as to the number
of prior incidents.
93. Id.
94. Id.at 605, 645 P.2d at 918.
95. Id.at 609, 645 P.2d at 922.
96. Id.at 610, 612, 645 P.2d at 920, 922 (trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment).
97. Id.at 610, 645 P.2d at 922.
98. Id.
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Model Act only because, fortuitously, Hug verbally abused Gomez on at
least one occasion prior to Hug's outburst in the administrator's office.
In Dominguez v. Stone" the plaintiff was a twenty-two year old Mexican
national who had been residing legally in the United States since she was
three. She was the director of the Senior Citizens Program in the Village
of Central, New Mexico and supervised five citizens of the United States
working under her. The defendant was a white member of the Board of
Trustees of Central that governed the village and supervised the Senior
Citizens Program. The majority of the Board of Trustees were of Spanish
or Mexican descent.
During a public meeting of the Village Trustees, the defendant learned
by reading an affirmative action plan that the plaintiff was a Mexican, not
a Spanish American. 100 The defendant was surprised and said: "Mexican,
huh. What does that mean exactly?"' 01 He then asked the plaintiff whether
she had applied for citizenship and whether she had registered to vote in
the United States.' °2 When she declined to answer these questions, he became
outraged and said: "I feel like that anybody who works for the City of
Central should be a citizen and especially if she's over five American
citizens. I think one of them should be the director."' 0 3 The Village Trustees
then went into a closed executive session. The trustees asked the plaintiff
and others to leave the meeting room. The plaintiff sat outside the room
and heard the defendant shout: "She's a Mexican. You see her? She's a
Mexican. That is not fair. There's no way. Why should she be employed?
She's a Mexican. She's a Mexican."'' 4 Later, the plaintiff heard the defendant say that the custodian, an American, should replace the plaintiff as
director, and that the plaintiff should do the cleaning. 05
The Village Trustees did not fire the plaintiff. She returned to work
the next day.'0 However, she felt "very ill" and went to see a doctor who
prescribed a painkiller for muscle tension." 7 The appellate court reversed
the trial court's summary judgment for the defendant and recommended
that the trial judge recuse himself, thereby allowing the supreme court to
appoint another trial judge.10 8 The appellate court explained: "It is common
knowledge in New Mexico that the word 'Mexican' when used in circumstances similar to those in the instant case connotes prejudice and dispar-

99. 97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (1981).
100. Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 217, 219, 638 P.2d 423, 429, 431 (1981).
Presumably, the Village Trustees were considering an issue related to the operation of the
Senior Citizens Program since the plaintiff was present at the meeting.
101. Id. at 219, 638 P.2d at 431.
102. Id. at 212, 218, 638 P.2d at 424, 431.

103. Id. at 218, 638 P.2d at 430.
104. Id. at 220, 638 P.2d at 432. The plaintiff took notes of what she overheard as she
sat outside the meeting room.
105. Id. at 221, 638 P.2d at 433.
106. Id.

107. Id.
108. Id. at 216, 638 P.2d at 428.
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agement."' 9 The court reprimanded the defendant by quoting the words of
Franklin D. Roosevelt in an address to the Daughters of the American
Revolution in 1938: "Remember, remember always, that all of us, you and
10
I especially, are descended from immigrants."'
Contrast this stirring opinion written by Judge Lopez with Section 6103 of the Model Act. The Model Act would preclude the plaintiff in
Dominguez from recovering damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress because the plaintiff was not the victim of "a pattern of communication evincing a continuity of purpose." The plaintiff merely was the
victim of an isolated, discriminatory incident.
Gomez and Dominguez tell us that the tort law governing racial epithets"'
extends to ethnic harassment. The utterance of an isolated ethnic epithet
may be regarded as extreme and outrageous conduct. The best explanation
for the judiciary's decision to extend the law governing racial epithets to
ethnic epithets is provided by Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.:112
As we as a nation of immigrants become more aware of the
need for pride in our diverse backgrounds, racial epithets which
were once part of common usage may not now be looked upon as
"mere insulting language." Changing sensitivity in society alters the
acceptability of former terms .... The same conclusion is compelled
with regard to Mexican-Americans and the various slang epithets
that may have once been in common usage regarding them. It is
for the trier of fact to determine, taking into account changing
social conditions and plaintiff's own susceptibility, whether the
3
particular conduct was sufficient to constitute extreme outrage."
C. Sexual Harassment
Plaintiffs who have been allowed to proceed with a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the defendant's utterance
of a racial or ethnic epithet often have alleged only a single incident of
discriminatory speech." 4 By contrast, plaintiffs that have sued successfully
in tort for verbal sexual harassment almost always have alleged a pattern
of discriminatory communication." 5 In this section I explore the reasons
for the current common-law requirement of a "pattern of communication"
in tort actions for verbal sexual harassment.
1. Sexual Propositions
The "pattern of communication" requirement in tort actions for sexual
harassment originated in cases involving requests for a sexual relationship.

109. Id. at 213, 638 P.2d at 428.
110. Id. at 214, 638 P.2d at 428.

111. See supra text accompanying notes 65-83.
112.
113.
114.
115.

88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977).
Id. at 741-42, 565 P.2d at 1177. •
See supra Part II, §§ A & B (discussing racial and ethnic harassment).
See infra text accompanying notes 126-166.
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Reed v. Maley" 6 is one of the first reported cases in the United States to
deal with the question of whether a woman should be allowed to sue in
tort for a single sexual proposition. The plaintiff in Reed was a married
woman who was sitting near the window of her house on a warm October
day when the defendant "approached near it, and proposed to her to have
sexual intercourse with him.""17 She indignantly refused the proposal." 8 As
a result of the incident, she experienced fright, mortification, and shame." 9
She sued in trespass, and the court characterized the "novel" issue presented
by the case as follows: "[W]ill a cause of action lie in favor of a woman
20
against a man who solicits her to have sexual intercourse with him?"'
Although the plaintiff's allegations failed to state a cause of action under
then existing tort law,12' the court was prepared to allow the recovery of
damages "if the cause of action can be made to rest upon some sound
principle of law."' 22
The plaintiff in Reed suggested that the court should recognize a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress by drawing an
analogy to the cases in which common carriers were held liable for wrong'
fully ejecting passengers in a "rude, offensive or high-handed manner."I
The court rejected the suggested analogy without explanation. Instead, the
court dismissed the complaint and justified its decision by referring to a
different analogy:
[D]efendant ... showed a purpose to seduce [the plaintiff]
from the path of virtue. If A should solicit B, a reputable citizen,
to join him in the commission of the crime of arson, larceny, or
robbery, B would indignantly reject the solicitation. He might
become excited, and feel humiliated and ashamed to have been thus
approached, and might have worried over it for days and nights
thereafter; but could he maintain an action against A for thus
approaching him with such an infamous proposition? We think not.
Suppose a bawd should solicit a man upon a public street to have
sexual intimacy with her; he certainly could not maintain a civil
action against her. If an action could be maintained by a woman
against a man for such solicitation, the same right to maintain one

116. 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903).
117. Id. at 818, 74 S.W. at 1080. The defendant's exact words were: "Won't you meet
me out somewhere? Won't you meet me alone somewhere?" Id. at 825, 74 S.W. at 1082
(Hobson, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 818, 74 S.W. 1080.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. The defendant had not committed an assault because the defendant had created
no immediate danger of harmful or offensive contact, nor had he trespassed on the plaintiff's
property. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The law governing common carriers was stated later in RESTATEmENT (SEcoND)
OF ToRTs § 48 (1965), the text of which is quoted in supra note 28.
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would exist in his favor. Whilst he might not suffer the same
anguish and humiliation on account of such solicitation as the
woman, yet the right of recovery would be the same. The amount
of it would only be determined by reason of the difference in effect
such a solicitation would have upon one or the other. Society and
the moral sentiments of the people strongly condemn conduct like
that with which the appellee is charged, but there is no principle
a civil
of law known to us which will enable a party to maintain
24
action upon facts like those here under consideration.
The justification for the court's decision in Reed was reduced to a single
sentence by Professor Magruder: "[There is no harm in asking." 125 Or, at
least, there is no harm in asking once.
Samms v. Eccles 2 6 posed the question of whether there is harm in
asking "repeatedly and persistently."' 2 7 The court concluded that a continuous pattern of sexual solicitation should be actionable in tort. 28 The
plaintiff in Eccles, like the plaintiff in Reed, was a married woman. For
eight months the defendant called the plaintiff by phone at various hours
of the day and night and solicited her to have illicit sexual relations with
him. 2 9 The court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress:
We quite agree with the idea that under usual circumstances
the solicitation to sexual intercourse would not be actionable even
though it may be offensive to the offeree. It seems to be a custom
of long standing and one which in all likelihood will continue....
But ... situations ... where tolerance for the conduct referred
to is indulged . . . are clearly distinguishable from the aggravated
circumstances the plaintiff claims existed here. 30
Because the defendant repeatedly had solicited the plaintiff to have
intercourse with him, and because the plaintiff repeatedly had rejected the
defendant's advances, the majority of the court in Samms v. Eccles ruled
that the plaintiff had satisfied the requirements of Section 46 of the
Restatement of Torts. 3' That is, the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant
intentionally had inflicted emotional distress'3 2 by actions "of such a nature

124. Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079, 1080 (1903).
125. Magruder, supra note 21, at 1055.
126. 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
127. Id. at 290, 358 P.2d at 345.
128. Id. at 294, 358 P.2d at 347.
129. Id. at 290, 358 P.2d at 345.
130. Id. at 294, 358 P.2d at 347.
131. Id. at 293-94, 358 P.2d at 346-47. The case was decided under the original version
of Section 46. RE.STATEM:ENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948). For the history of the evolution of
Section 46, see supra note 27.
132. The majority found that the defendant had "intentionally engaged in conduct toward
the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or (b) where any reasonable
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as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against
1
the generally accepted standards of decency and morality."' 33
Modern tort cases involving purely verbal sexual harassment have not
departed from the distinction drawn in Samms between single and repeated
solicitations to sexual intercourse. Plaintiffs have recovered damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress only in those cases in which they
have been the victims of a pattern of verbal harassment. 3 4 For example, a
woman who was abused 135 verbally by her manager two or three times a
week for a period of two years was allowed to recover $10,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages when she sued her employer
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.'36 And a secretary, whose
plant manager repeatedly asked her to go out with him socially and generally
endeavored to engage her in sexually related conversation, was allowed to
proceed with her cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against her employer. 1
2.

Sexual Epithets

The "pattern of communication" requirement that originated in the
"sexual proposition" cases seems to have carried over into the "sexual
epithet" cases. Although racial and ethnic slurs are sometimes actionable
when spoken in a single incident, 13 the only actionable sexual epithets that
I found in the reported cases were all spoken as part of a pattern of
communication.

person would have known that such would result ... ." Samms, 11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d
at 347. The dissenting judge took the position that the evidence "fails to show that the
defendant deliberately intended to injure the plaintiff by his unwelcome attentions" and that
there was no evidence that the defendant "knew or should have known that his conduct would
result in severe emotional distress to the plaintiff." Id. (Callister, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Brown
v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C. App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989). Sexual harassment cases
based on conduct or speech plus conduct have imposed liability for intentional infliction of
emotional distress without requiring proof of a pattern of communication. See, e.g., Lucas v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984); Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.
Cal. 1986); Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1982); Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant
Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 734 P.2d
580 (1987); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1984); O'Reilly v. Executone of
Albany, Inc., 121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1986); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 79
N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116 (1986); McCalla v. Ellis, 129 Mich. App. 452, 341 N.W.2d
525 (1983).
135. Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C. App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (manager
made sexually suggestive remarks and gestures toward plaintiff).
136. Id.
137. Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909, 914-16 (E.D. Pa. 1983). But see
Bowersox v. P.H. GIatfelter Co., 677 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (plaintiff stated cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because she alleged verbal harassment
plus retaliation when she rebuffed defendant's advances; verbal harassment alone would have
been insufficient to state cause of action).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 42-64, 99-110.
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The historical origins of the implicit "pattern of communication"
requirement in sexual epithet cases can be traced back to Brooker v.
3 9
Silverthorne1
The defendant, a man who had become impatient with a
telephone operator, shouted into the receiver: "You God damned woman!
None of you attend to your business. You are a God damned liar. If I
were there, I would break your God damned neck."'' 4 The court denied
damages to the plaintiff, who alleged that she had suffered emotional
distress and consequent illness. Brooker was cited by Professor Magruder
to illustrate the proposition that courts should not impose tort liability for
"insulting language" because it would be unfortunate if the law closed all
the safety valves "through which irascible tempers might legally blow off
steam.' 14' The case then was utilized to illustrate comment d to Section 46
142
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Given the law's reluctance to impose tort liability for "mere insults,"
the victims of sexual epithets have recovered damages only in cases involving
repeated verbal abuse. For example, in Swentek v. USAIR, Inc.143 the
plaintiff, a flight attendant, was permitted to go to the jury on allegations
that the defendant, a pilot, told the plaintiff on separate occasions during
a nine month period that she was "an outstanding snatch," called her a
"cunt," and said that "I wish I were a coat so that I could wrap myself
around your big tits."1 44 The defendant also had made taunting remarks
about the plaintiff's off-duty attire. 45 The trial court judge directed a verdict
for the defendant on the theory that the plaintiff's allegations were not
sufficiently outrageous to establish a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The trial court noted that the defendant's "sexual
banter" was "the kind of conduct that everybody at USAIR was engaged
in" and that it was "not intended" to harass the plaintiff. '6 The appellate
court reversed for the following reasons:
139. 111 S.C. 553, 99 S.E. 350 (1919).
140. Brooker v. Silverthome, Ill S.C. 553, 555, 99 S.E. 350, 351 (1919). Although a
modem reader would see only profanity in the quoted passage, the term "woman" was deemed
offensive in the nineteenth century. It was avoided as a Victorian sexual taboo because it had
acquired the meaning, "paramour or mistress." Schulz, The Semantic Derogationof Woman,
in LANGUAGE AND SEX: DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE 64, 71 (B. Thorn & N. Henley ed. 1975).
The word "female" was preferred over "woman" in the nineteenth century, but soon "female"
was considered degrading, and it was replaced by "lady," which in turn became vulgarized.
As a society we have now come full circle, and "woman," newly rehabilitated, is the term of
choice for referring to a person of the female sex. See generally H. BosMArIAN, Tan LANGUAGE
OF OPPRESSION (1974); J. COATES, WOMEN, MEN AND LANGUAGE (1986); R. LAKOFF, LANGUAGE
AN WOMAN'S PLACE (1975); C. KRAsA
, WOMEN AND MEN SPEAKING (1981); A. NELSEN,
H. BosswiAN, H. GERSHUNY & J. STANLEY, SEXISM AND LANGUAGE (1977); P. ROTHENBERG,
RACISM AND SEXISM (1988).
141. Magruder, supra note 21, at 1053.
142. For the full text of the REsTATE )ENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965),
see supra text accompanying note 29.
143. 830 F. 2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
144. Id.at 555 n.2.
145. Id. at 555.

146. Id.at 562.
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We agree with the trial court that claims of bad manners, rude
behavior and hurt feelings do not state a claim for emotional
distress. The workplace is not a Victorian parlor, and the courts
are not the arbiters of its etiquette. In this case, however, plaintiff
claimed something beyond the ordinary run of insult and offense
which people are expected to encounter.1 47
Similarly, in Hall v. Gus Construction Co. 48 the plaintiffs, who worked
as "flag persons" on the defendant's road construction sites, were allowed
to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress after the
male crew members repeatedly called them "fucking flag girls," wrote
"Cavern Cunt" and "Blond Bitch" on the car in which they rode, and
49
repeatedly asked them if they "wanted to fuck" or engage in oral sex.1
Male crew members also flashed pornographic pictures of naked couples
engaged in oral intercourse at the women.' 50 The appellate court noted that
plaintiffs had anticipated hearing a good deal of profanity on the job but
that the plaintiffs did not expect "the unrelenting pattern" of verbal and
psychic abuse to which the plaintiffs ultimately were subjected.' The court
concluded that the pattern of verbal abuse went "well beyond the bounds
of what any person should have to tolerate."' 52
Since tort actions for purely verbal sexual harassment almost always
involve a "pattern of communication," the adoption of Section 6-103(b) of
the Model Act would not have the same type of adverse impact on the
reported cases of sexual harassment as it would on the reported claims for
racial and ethnic harassment. However, one might question whether a
"pattern of communication" requirement ought to be imposed in all sexual
harassment cases. For example, is it really necessary for a defendant
repeatedly to utter demeaning sexual epithets before they rise to the level
of extreme and outrageous conduct? Why is it actionable to call a black
man a "nigger," but not actionable to call a black woman a "black bitch"
or a "Cavern Cunt"? Are not isolated sexual epithets every bit as degrading
as isolated racial or ethnic epithets? 53 Surely these sexual epithets cause the
same type of adverse impact on the victim's sense of self-esteem, 54 and
they reinforce the same types of historical patterns of oppression as racial
55
or ethnic epithets.

147. Id.
148. 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
149. Id. at 1012.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1018.
152. Id.
153. See supra note 140.
154. See generally Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L. J. 1559 (1989).
155. See generally Words That Wound, supra note 1, at 157. But see Wolman, Verbal
Sexual Harassment on the Job as IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress, 17 CAP. U. L.
Rav. 245, 269-71 (1988).
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Similarly, is it really necessary for a defendant repeatedly to commu-

nicate pornographic messages before the conduct can be called "extreme
and outrageous"? Why should the female flag persons in Hall not be
entitled to monetary relief for that moment when male crew members
"flashed obscene pictures of naked couples engaged in oral intercourse at
the women"? T56 Why should a plaintiff not be entitled to damages if her
supervisor leaves a pornographic picture or magazine on her desk? 5 7 Don't

such isolated discriminatory communications create "an atmosphere in which
women are viewed as men's sexual playthings, rather than as their equal
workers"? 5 8
Finally, is it really true that there is "no harm in asking"?1S9 Consider
the fact pattern in Monge v. Superior Court.'6 In Monge one of the two
plaintiffs, Allison Patton, received a message on her computer screen: "How
about a little head?"' 61 Patton believed that the officers of the corporation
"had conspired to create the message" and that the message "was directed

to her as a sexual proposition."1

62

She complained to her immediate super-

visor, plaintiff Martha Monge, who transmitted the complaint to the offi-

cers. After refusing to investigate the alleged act, the officers engaged in a
"systematic course of retaliation"'6 3 against both Allison Patton and Martha
Monge. As a result, both employees were "forced to resign."' 64 The court
ruled that both plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 65 The plaintiffs in Monge were allowed to
go to trial because they had alleged "speech plus conduct"-a single sexual

proposition plus retaliatory conduct. 66 But what if there had been no
retaliation? What if there had been only the single sexual proposition? Was
156. See supra text accompanying note 150.
157. Shrout v. Black Clawson, 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
158. Barbetta v. Chemlawn Serv. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
159. See generally Comment, The Harms of Asking: Towards Comprehensive Treatment
of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 328 (1988).
160. 176 Cal. App. 3d 503, 222 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1986).
161. Id. at 507, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
162. Id.
163. Id. The defendant officers "changed the plaintiffs' working environment, hours,
lunch and other privileges, and demoted the [pilaintiffs to lesser positions." Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 511, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
166. Id. Accord Bowersox v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 677 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Pa. 1988).
Such cases are analogous to quid pro quo sexual harassment, in which a defendant makes a
request for sexual favors and threatens to take adverse action against the plaintiff if the
plaintiff does not grant the defendant's request.
I have been informed by Jill Talbot that Section 2-101 of the Model Act is intended to
allow recovery of damages in a case involving "speech plus retaliatory conduct." Letter of
January 15, 1990, from Jill S. Talbot to Jean C. Love (on file with author). I would suggest
that Section 6-103 of the Model Act be amended to provide that a "course of conduct" means
either "a pattern of communication or any type of communication plus conduct that evinces
a continuity of purpose" to harass. If amended, a case like Monge would be actionable under
Section 6-103, and the plaintiff could ignore Section 2-101. Jill Talbot has expressed her
approval of my proposed amendment. Id.
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this communication really a "good faith" solicitation to sexual intercourse?

Surely the three officers of the corporation did not expect an affirmative
response from Allison Patton. When a single "sexual proposition" is
communicated so obviously in bad faith, it makes no sense to require its
repetition as a prerequisite to the imposition of tort liability.
D.

Religious Harassment

The Model Act prohibits harassment or intimidation of an individual

on account of religion. 167 Professor Robert O'Neil points out that there are
many types of religious expression that enjoy varying levels of constitutional

protection.' 6 8 Professor O'Neil would classify the Model Act as a prohibition

on "speech that offends religious feelings"-a type of speech that historically has been subject to state regulation despite the first amendment. 169
Most obviously, the Model Act would impose tort liability for the utterance
of religious epithets. The following types of taunts would be actionable
under Section 6-103: "Christ killer,' ' 170 "Jew-boy,' 7 1 "kike,"' 72 and "god-

damn Jew.' 1 73 Jews have been persecuted not only on the basis of their
religion, but also on the basis of their national origin and race. 74 Therefore,
although the preceding epithets are illustrative of religious harassment, they
17
also might be actionable as instances of racial or ethnic harassment. 1 Just
1 76
as racial epithets were once a matter of "common usage,'
so anti-Semitic

sentiments were once considered "acceptable even in polite society.'

'

77

But

as a result of the civil rights movement, religious harassment is now no

78
more acceptable than harassment on the basis of race or ethnicity.1
I have been unable to find a case in which a plaintiff brought a tort
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon purely

167. See supra text accompanying note 1.
168. O'Neil, Religious Expression: Speech or Worship-or Both?, 54 Mo. L. Rv. 501
(1989). Professor O'Neil identifies four types of religious expression: 1) speech that offends
religious feelings; 2) religious publications; 3) religious silence; and 4) religious speech on
public property.
169. Id. at 506-08.
170. Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (E.D. Va. 1984) (Title VII action;
judgment for plaintiff).
171. Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 158 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (Title VII action;
judgment for plaintiff).
172. Id.
173. Id. For a discussion of an action for religious harassment by a Catholic plaintiff,
see Slamon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
174. A. HERTZBERG, THE JEws IN AMERICA: FouR CENTURIES OF AN UNEASY ENCOUNTER
(1989); A. KAYS, THE JEwIsH EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (1969).
175. Comment, Racial Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982: Proof or Perceptions?
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 5 LAW & INEQUALITY 161 (1987).
176. See supra text accompanying note 113.
177. United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1528 (l1th Cir. 1986) (declaring mistrial due
to jury misconduct in form of racial and religious slurs).
178. Id. See also supra note 174.
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verbal religious harassment. 79 However, the issues that would be raised by
such a case are fully explored in Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights
Appeal Board,80 a cause of action for emotional distress damages"' brought
under New York's state employment discrimination statute. 82 The plaintiff
in ImperialDiner was a mother of three who was attending graduate school

and working for the defendant as a waitress on the weekends. The plaintiff
had been assigned to work behind the counter, a less desirable position, on
both Saturday and Sunday. She complained to the defendant, the president,
who apparently did nothing. However, the head waitress decided to assign
her to a table station. Later, when the plaintiff saw the president, she
thanked him, thinking that he was responsible for the reassignment. He
responded by saying that the complainant thought she was special because

she was Jewish, "just like all the other fucking Jewish broads around
here."' 3 When she expressed shock and disbelief, he told her that she had
heard correctly; that all the "fucking Jewish women" at the diner "think

they are something special and deserve more than the others."'184 He refused
to apologize. She left the diner and went home. The defendant never agreed
185
to apologize, and the plaintiff never returned to work.

The Human Rights commissioner ordered the defendant to pay $500 in

damages for the "shock, humiliation and outrage" that the plaintiff experienced.1 6 The award was reversed by the appellate division because "the

record is devoid of evidence showing a systematic exclusion or restriction,
or a generalized pattern of unlawful discrimination, or any evidence of
persistent religious or other unlawful discrimination directed at the complainant."' 87 The court of appeals reinstated the commissioner's award on

the ground that "the statute prohibits discrimination, and not just repeated
discriminatory acts."'

8

The court of appeals justified its interpretation of

179. Actually, there is a case recently decided that almost falls into this category. The
plaintiff, the only Jewish woman in her department, was called a "Hebe" and a "kike" (pure
speech) before she was denied promotions and allegedly forced to resign (speech plus conduct).
Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 A.D.2d 169, 548 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1989) (2-1 decision).
The appellate division found that she had failed to prove extreme and outrageous conduct.
Id.

180. 52 N.Y.2d 72, 417 N.E.2d 525 (1980).
181. The plaintiff also sought back pay and an apology. Id. at 74-75, 417 N.E.2d at 52728.
182. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296(1)(a). Unlike Title VII, the New York law allows the recovery
of compensatory damages for discriminatory acts.
183. Imperial Diner, 52 N.Y.2d at 76, 417 N.E.2d at 527.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 76, 417 N.E.2d at 528. The commissioner also awarded back pay and ordered
the defendant to apologize in writing to the plaintiff. Id. at 76, 417 N.E.2d at 527-28. The
dissenting judges thought that the directive to apologize might be in violation of the defendant's
first amendment right to remain silent, but the issue had not been raised by the defendant,
and, therefore, was not before the court. Id. at 80, 417 N.E.2d at 529.
187. Id. at 77, 417 N.E.2d at 528.
188. Id. at 78, 417 N.E.2d at 528.
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the statute by observing that "[t]his type of vilification is humiliating, not
only when it is done wholesale, but also and perhaps especially, when it is
directed at a lone individual in an isolated incident."' 189
It is interesting to speculate on how a case like Imperial Diner might
be decided under Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. '9 If
Imperial Diner were regarded as a case of sexual harassment, the plaintiff
might be precluded from recovering damages because she failed to establish
a "pattern of communication."' 9'g Rather, she was the victim of an isolated
sexual epithet. But if the action were characterized as a case of a religious
slur, then the plaintiff might be allowed to recover damages by analogy to
the cases in which the victims of a single racial' 92 or ethnic 93 epithet have
been awarded monetary relief. Thus, Imperial Diner poses the classic problem of how to classify a cause of action that is brought by a plaintiff
against whom the defendant has discriminated on two grounds simultaneously. 194 It also illustrates the way in which the law encourages such a
plaintiff to ignore her sex and focus on her race, ethnicity, or religion
because she is more apt to prevail if she deemphasizes the former and
95
highlights the latter.
Regardless of how Imperial Diner might be decided under Section 46
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the plaintiff's cause of action unquestionably would be barred by Section 6-103 of the Model Communicative
Torts Act because the plaintiff did not stay in the diner long enough to
experience a "pattern of communication." Even though she suffered discrimination on two grounds simultaneously, the Model Act would preclude
the recovery of damages. Section 6-103 contains no provision providing that
cumulative acts of discrimination are the equivalent of a "pattern of
communication."
E. Summary
The comment to Section 6-103 proudly proclaims that "[t]he Section
offers protection that current law does not adequately provide." Quite to
the contrary, however, the preceding discussion demonstrates that Section
189. Id.
190. See supra note 179.
191. See supra Part II, § C. Note that I have criticized the rigid imposition of a "pattern
of communication" requirement on all actions for sexual harassment. I have been particularly
critical of the requirement in the context of sexual epithets.
192. See supra Part II, § A.
193. See supra Part II, § B.
194. For a discussion of discrimination against black women, see Austin, SapphireBound,
1989 Wisc. L. REv. 539 (1989); Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our
Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HAsv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 9 (1989).
195. The statement in the text is true particularly with regard to constitutional litigation
under the fourteenth amendment because sex-based classifications are subjected to a lower
standard of judicial review than race-based classifications. Scales-Trent, supra note 194, at 2035.
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6-103, in fact, precludes liability for isolated racial, ethnic, and religious
slurs, whereas current tort law sometimes affords relief. 196 Moreover, the
Model Act, at best, codifies current case law regarding tort liability for
verbal sexual harassment. 197 It provides no protection for isolated instances
of such egregious misconduct.
In addition to restricting liability for discriminatory speech, the Model
Act also curtails existing remedies.'19 Under current tort law, a plaintiff
who sues for intentional infliction of emotional distress is entitled to
compensatory and punitive damages, plus injunctive relief in appropriate
circumstances. 9 9 By contrast, a plaintiff who sues under Section 6-103 is
restricted to the recovery of only compensatory damages plus injunctive
relief. Furthermore, attorneys' fees are not recoverable under Section 9-106.
Consequently, the plaintiff who brings an action under Section 6-103 will
have to pay the attorney out of the compensatory damage award. Because
such awards are typically modest in amount, 200 Section 9-106 will serve as
a substantial disincentive to the pursuit of claims under Section 6-103.201
Based on my analysis, I would recommend against the enactment of
Section 6-103 as written. Instead, I would favor the codification of the
common-law action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the
next Part, I discuss the advantages of retaining or codifying the commonlaw tort action. I also consider the issues that are apt to arise if victims of
discriminatory speech are allowed to pursue claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.

III.

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL

DIsmEss

Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "one
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally ... causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress. '202 The primary advantage of Section 46 over Section 6-103 of the
Model Act is its inclusiveness. Anyone who has sustained severe emotional
distress under the proscribed circumstances may file a complaint under
Section 46. The plaintiff need not allege that the defendant harassed the
plaintiff on the basis of race, sex, ethnicity, or religion. 203 Instead, the

196. See supra Part II, §§ A, B, D.
197. See supra Part II, § C.
198. See supra text accompanying note 2.
199. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDiES § 7.3(1),(2),(5) (2d
ed. forthcoming).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53, 136, 186.
201. Attorneys' fees typically are recoverable in most types of civil rights litigation precisely
because awards of compensatory damages are small in amount. See generally D. DOBBS, supra
note 199, at § 7.4(5). Plaintiffs who bring actions for intentional infliction of emotional
distress under current law usually pay their attorneys out of their punitive damage awards.
See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 199, at § 7.3(2).
202. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
203. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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plaintiff could claim harassment on the basis of such factors as sexual

orientation, 204 weight, 205 or handicap.20 Moreover, the plaintiff would not
have to claim harassment on the basis of membership in any oppressed
group. It would be sufficient to claim a violation of the plaintiff's
individual
20 7

sense of personhood resulting in severe emotional distress.
The second advantage of Section 46 over Section 6-103 of the Model

Act is that Section 46 does not require proof of a "pattern of communication." Thus, under Section 46, monetary relief would be available to the

black cook who was told by his boss: "You're not a human being, you're
a nigger.''0 A cause of action could be stated both by the woman who

was called a "Mexican" in a disparaging tone of voice 209 and by the man
who was called a "fucking spic" and a "fucking Mexican greaser" by his
employer. 210 Liability for damages could be established by the woman who
was told that she was a "fucking Jewish broad. ' 21 1 The flight attendant in

Swentak2 2 could premise a cause of action upon the pilot's calling her a
"cunt." The female flag persons in HallP3 could claim damages for the

road crew's isolated act of writing "Cavern Cunt" and "Blond Bitch" on
their car. Compensatory and punitive damages would be recoverable by the

black lawyer who was called a "black son-of-a-bitch" in the motel restaurant. 214 Furthermore, the lawyer's wife and son, as members of his immediate
family, would be entitled to recover damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, provided they could prove that they in fact had sustained
severe emotional distress. 2 5 Moreover, his in-laws could claim damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, provided the in-laws could prove

216
that they had sustained severe emotional distress resulting in bodily harm.
A final advantage of imposing liability under Section 46 is that the
'21 7
victim of a dually discriminatory epithet may sue as a "whole person.

204. See, e.g., Moye v. Gary, 595 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Logan v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 466 So. 2d 121 (Ala. 1985).
205. See, e.g., Russell v. Salve Regina College, 890 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1989); King v.
Burris, 588 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1984).
206. See, e.g., Paris v. Division of State Compensation Ins. Fund, 517 P.2d 1353 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1973).
207. See, e.g., Margita v. Diamond Mortgate Corp., 159 Mich. App. 181, 406 N.W.2d
268 (1987) (plaintiff called "ignorant" and "stupid"; summary judgment for defendant
reversed); Hassing v. Wortman, 214 Neb. 154, 333 N.W.2d 765 (1983) (defendant revealed
premarital pregnancy of ex-spouse; judgment for plaintiff reversed) (dissenting opinion);
Reamsnyder v. Jaskolski, 10 Ohio St. 3d 150, 462 N.E.2d 392 (1984) (defendant threatened
to "tear face off" of plaintiff; defendant's motion to dismiss claim denied).
208. See supra text accompanying note 60.
209. See supra text accompanying note 109.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 144-45.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
214. See supra text accompanying note 44.
215.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF

TORTS

§

46(2) (1965).

216. Id.
217. See generally Scales-Trent, supra note 194.
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For example, if a black female prison guard were to be called a "black
bitch" by her co-workers, 28 she would be entitled to claim damages as the
victim of both a racial and a sexual epithet. 219 Similarly, if a Hispanic
female were to be called a "bitch," a "spic," and a "thief" by the
employees of a retail store who erroneously suspected her of shoplifting,
she would be entitled to claim damages as the victim of three interrelated
epithets.220 The damages recoverable by such plaintiffs would be measured
22
by the cumulative effect of the discriminatory communication. '
Since the purposes of tort law are vindication, compensation, deterrence,
and punishment, it is better to impose liability under an all-inclusive rule
of law than under a statute that sanctions only certain categories of
discriminatory speech. Section 46 will allow any victim of hurtful speech
who has sustained severe emotional distress to obtain both vindication and
compensation, provided the plaintiff can prove that the defendant's conduct
violated society's norms of civility. At the same time, Section 46 will deter
and punish all types of extreme and outrageous conduct.
For these reasons, I prefer Section 46 as the vehicle for redressing
harms caused by words that wound. Nonetheless, Section 46 is not a perfect
means to that end. I now turn to some of the problems posed by the three
basic elements of the common-law cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress: (1) intent, (2) extreme and outrageous conduct, and
(3) severe emotional distress. With respect to each element, I recommend
that the common-law action be modified in certain ways in order to make
it a more effective vehicle for vindicating the rights of the victims of
discriminatory speech. As I make my analysis, I draw on the lessons that
can be learned from the language of Section 6-103 of the Model Act.
A.

Extreme and Outrageous Conduct

The critical issue in a cause of action brought under Section 46 is
whether the defendant has engaged in "extreme and outrageous conduct."M
If so, it is relatively easy to prove both the requisite intent and the severity
of the plaintiff's emotional distress. 22 However, the requirement of proving
extreme and outrageous conduct can be quite problematic for victims of
discriminatory speech.

218. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987) (Title VII action).
219. Bennett v. New York City Dep't of Corrections, 705 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(§ 1981 case).
220. Jefferson Ward Stores v. Khorozian, 519 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress action).
221. Note that a plaintiff who has experienced dual discrimination may be entitled to a
greater award of damages than a victim of a single type of discrimination.
222. Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 42
(1982). See also REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) oF ToRTs § 46 comments d, i, j (1965).
223. REsTATEmNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 comments d, i, j (1985).
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Victims of discriminatory speech are practically always members of
minority or oppressed groups. Yet the test of liability under Section 46 is
whether "the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community
would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim
(outrageous!' ",224 Not surprisingly, there are reported cases of racial, ethnic,
and religious epithets in which the victim's claim has been dismissed, even
though members of the minority community to which the plaintiff belongs
surely would have exclaimed, "Outrageous"!
For example, in Lay v. Roux Laboratories, Inc.225 a black woman
alleged that, when she parked her car in a reserved space in the company
parking lot, a white male supervisor began to threaten her with the loss of
her job, and then began to use "humiliating language, vicious verbal attacks,
racial epithets and called plaintiff a 'nigger .... ,"226 The court dismissed
her complaint, stating that "although the alleged conduct is extremely
reprehensible, we do not think that the alleged conduct reaches the level of
outrageousness... ."227
And in Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust & Co.228 the plaintiff, a Jewish
woman who was denied promotion in her department, alleged that she had
been called a "Hebe" and a "kike." 229 The majority of the court upheld
the dismissal of her claim for the following reasons:
While we share the indignation of our dissenting colleague over
the use of the religious and ethnic slurs "Hebe" and "kike," the
particular conduct complained of in this case did not rise to such
an extreme or outrageous level as to meet the threshold requirement
for the tort. Although the occasional use of such derogatory and
demeaning remarks reflects a certain level of narrowmindedness and
meanspiritedness, this is not a case "where severe mental pain or
anguish [was] inflicted through a deliberate and malicious campaign
of harassment or intimidation". . . . Certainly the use of any religious, ethnic or racial slur must be strongly disapproved and condemned. However, the fact that we view the alleged conduct as
being deplorable and reprehensible does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that it arose to such a level that the law must provide
a remedy. "[lit is manifestly neither practical nor desirable for the
law to provide a remedy against any and all activity which an
23 0
individual might find annoying." [Citation omitted.]
The dissenting judge found it "inconceivable" that calling a person a
"Hebe" or a "kike" "in her place of employment, or anywhere else for

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. § 46 comment d.
379 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
Id. at 452.
Id.
152 A.D.2d 169, 548 N.Y.S.2d 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
Id. at
, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
Id. at
, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
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that matter, " could be characterized as a "mere insult, indignity, or
annoyance.'"231
These two cases are particularly troubling because the plaintiffs were
denied the opportunity to have their claims heard by a jury of their peers.
In both cases, the trial and appellate court judges ruled as a matter of law
that the defendants had not engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct.
Imagine how it would feel to be the female victim of a deliberately
demeaning racial or religious epithet, only to be told by a white male judge
that you have suffered a harm that the law does not recognize.
There are several possible solutions to the problem presented by the
majoritarian test of "outrageousness." One possibility is the solution adopted
by the drafters of the Model Act.2 2 Having abolished the cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the drafters created a similar
cause of action for discriminatory speech in Section 6-103. The Model Act's
cause of action for discriminatory speech is limited to cases involving verbal
harassment on the basis of race, sex, ethnicity, or religion. No "extreme
and outrageous" requirement is imposed. The practical effect of this approach is to presume that these statutory categories of discriminatory speech
constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.
My chief difficulty with the approach adopted by the Model Act is that
it will preclude the recovery of damages in cases that fall outside the
categories listed in Section 6-103. Consider, for example, the plight of
Robert Logan. Robert is a gay male who operates a beauty salon in
Birmingham, Alabama. He received a call from a female employee of Sears,
Roebuck and Company who wanted to know whether he had made his
monthly charge account payments. While he was looking for his checkbook,
he heard the woman tell someone on her end of the line: "This guy is as
queer as a three-dollar bill. ' 233 Robert is barred from filing a claim under
Section 6-103 because his claim is not based on the utterance of a racial,
sexual, ethnic, or religious epithet. Rather, his claim is based on a homophobic epithet.
To protect the interests of the Robert Logans and other potential victims
of verbal abuse, I prefer to retain the common-law cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, in order to minimize
the problems caused by the majoritarian test of outrageousness, I would
propose a solution similar to that of Section 6-103. I would recommend
that the judiciary modify the common-law cause of action by adopting a
rebuttable presumption that certain categories of discriminatory speech meet
the extreme and outrageous conduct requirement. Specifically, if a member
of a group protected by existing antidiscrimination laws files an intentional

231. Id. at -,
548 N.Y.S.2d at 522 (Harwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 1-17.
233. Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121 (Ala. 1985) (summary judgment
for defendant in action for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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infliction of emotional distress claim alleging that the plaintiff has been
harassed or abused on the basis of membership in that group, the court
will presume that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous.
The effect of the presumption will be to preclude a court from dismissing
a claim, entering a summary judgment, or directing a verdict on the ground
that the defendant's conduct was not "extreme and outrageous." The
presumption will drop out of the case, however, once the case goes to the
jury. The presumption will have no impact whatsoever on the issues of
intent or severe emotional distress. In other words, a court could still dismiss
a claim, enter summary judgment for the defendant, or direct a verdict for
the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to allege or prove
the requisite elements of intent and severe emotional distress.
Consider the impact of my proposed presumption on the claims filed
by Donesta Lay, 2 4 Alma Leibowitz, 215 and Robert Logan. 236 Because federal,
state, and local laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race and religion,
Donesta Lay and Alma Leibowitz will be assured of a jury trial on the
issue of extreme and outrageous conduct, provided that they put on sufficient evidence of intent and severe emotional distress. By contrast, Robert
Logan will not receive the benefit of my proposed presumption because
neither the federal government, nor the state of Alabama, nor the City of
Birmingham prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Nevertheless, Robert Logan is better off under my proposal than under
Section 6-103 of the Model Act because my proposal does not preclude Robert
Logan from filing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
under Section 46. Rather, my proposal just denies him the benefit of the
presumption until such time as the federal, state, or local government enacts
legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
I do not mean to minimize the difficulties that gay and lesbian people
will encounter in attempting to establish the element of extreme and outrageous conduct without the benefit of my proposed presumption. In Robert
Logan's case, for example, the trial court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. 237 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
ruling for the following reasons:
We are unwilling to say that the use of the word "queer" to
describe a homosexual is atrocious and intolerable in civilized society. We recognize that there are other words favored by the
homosexual community in describing themselves, but the word
"queer" has been used for a long time by those outside the
community. It has been in use longer than the term "gay," which
has recently become the most frequently used term to describe

234.
235.
236.
237.

See supra text accompanying notes 225-27.
See supra text accompanying notes 228-31.
See supra text accompanying note 233.
Logan, 466 So. 2d at 124.
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Since Logan is admittedly a homosexual, can it be said realistically that being described as "queer" should cause him shame or
humiliation? We think not. In order to create a cause of action,
the conduct must be such that [it] would cause mental suffering,
shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities, not
conduct which would be considered unacceptable merely by homosexuals.23 9
I do not believe that members of the gay and lesbian community would
concur in the court's reasoning. As a member of that community myself, I
find this passage troublesome for at least two reasons. First of all, the
court's discussion of the descriptive terms "queer" and "gay" ignores the
full context in which the epithet at issue was spoken. The incident was one
in which a service provider at Sears gratuitously maligned a customer by
saying, "He's as 'queer as a three-dollar bill.' " Secondly, the test of
outrageousness adopted by the court assumes that only heterosexuals are
"persons of ordinary sensibilities." Under this test, no gay or lesbian person
will be able to establish liability under Section 46 as long as there is a wellestablished practice of homophobic verbal abuse by the dominant, heterosexual community.
In sum, I propose the retention of the tort action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in cases involving purely verbal harassment.
I also propose retention of the requirement that the harassment be extreme
and outrageous. I do this fully mindful of the problems that some victims
will encounter in satisfying this requirement. In order to minimize those
difficulties, I propose the adoption of a rebuttable presumption that verbal
harassment is "outrageous" whenever it is linked to membership in a class
protected by antidiscrimination laws.
B.

Intent

If a court chooses to adopt my proposed presumption of extreme and
outrageous conduct for discriminatory speech, then the question of intent
will become a more critical issue under Section 46. Defendants who have
argued that their conduct was not extreme and outrageous as a matter of
law will now argue that they did not intend to cause severe emotional
distress. It is, therefore, important to recognize that the test of intent under
Section 46 is not the exceedingly restrictive test of intent developed in equal
protection litigation under the fourteenth amendment. 24 Rather, it is the
238. Id. at 123. At this point in the opinion, the court inserts the following footnote:
"Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary ... dates 'queer' to about 1812 and 'gay' to
1953." Id.at 123 n.l.
239. Id. at 123.
240. For a discussion and critique of the test of intent under the fourteenth amendment,
see Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning With Unconscious Racism,
39 STmN. L. REv. 317 (1987). See also Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown, 56 U. Cm. L. Rv. 935 (1989).
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test of intent developed by the common-law courts in intentional tort actions.
The plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted for the purpose of causing
severe emotional distress or knew that such distress was substantially certain
to result. 241
The operation of the torts test of intent in cases involving discriminatory
speech can best be illustrated by a set of hypotheticals. First, imagine that
one football player called another a "nigger" in the heat of anger during
24
a fight on the field and apologized immediately after the game was over. 1
Under such circumstances, it is most unlikely that'the plaintiff could prove
the requisite intent because the defendant did not deliberately utter the
epithet and did not act for the purpose of causing severe emotional distress,
as evidenced by his apology. Second, imagine that one black judge affectionately said to another black judge in the privacy of the judicial chambers:
"You nigger."' ' 3 Once again, it is most unlikely that the plaintiff could
prove the requisite intent. In this case, the defendant meant to utter the
statement, but did not act for the purpose of causing severe emotional
distress.
Now, by contrast, imagine that a black woman parked in a space
reserved for her white male supervisor because there was no other place to
park her car in the company parking lot. He became enraged and called
her a "nigger." 2 4 He made no effort to apologize. Although he may not
have acted for the purpose of causing her severe emotional distress, nevertheless he knew that such distress was substantially certain to result.
Finally, imagine that a student returned an item to the defendant's retail
store, where a clerk required him to sign a slip on which the following
words were written: "Arrogant nigger refused exchange-says he doesn't
like products." 245 In this last hypothetical, the plaintiff would be able to
prove that the defendant acted for the purpose of inflicting severe emotional
distress.

241. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). See also Words That Wound, supra
note 1, at 145.
242. In a recent incident, Eric Andolsek of the Detroit Lions called Sam Jones of the
Houston Oilers a "nigger" during a fourth-quarter scuffle on the football field. Andolsek
said, "I was upset. You're playing as hard as you can possibly play and when things don't
go right, you start pushing and shoving. Things go. It's the first thing I said. I apologize;
what can I do?" Austin American-Statesman, Nov. 7, 1989, at El & 8.
243. The hypothetical was inspired by dictum in Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 114 Mich. App.
12, 19 n.2, 318 N.W.2d 558, 562 n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982):
Indeed, words that generally refer derogatorily to racial or ethnic classes may, in
some instances, not even rise to the level of insult. For example, I may refer to one
of my colleagues by way of ethnic slang without any intended or resulting slur,
insult or vilification. Rather, that remark would instead express the warmth and
admiration I feel for that colleague, and would proudly acknowledge that persons
of different ethnic origins can work together and engender mutual respect.
244. The hypothetical was inspired by Lay v. Roux Laboratories, Inc., 379 So. 2d 451
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (complaint dismissed).
245. The hypothetical was taken from the facts in Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc., 46 Ill.
App.
3d 162, 360 N.E.2d 983 (1977) (complaint dismissed; affirmed).
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Shifting the focus of litigation in discriminatory speech cases from the
issue of extreme and outrageous conduct to the issue of intent will be

beneficial in at least two respects. First of all, if the legislature has enacted
an antidiscrimination statute, it will be more appropriate to exonerate the
defendant from liability on the ground that the defendant did not intend
to cause severe emotional distress than on the ground that the defendant's
conduct was not extreme and outrageous. Second, if the defendant raises a
first amendment defense, the plaintiff's state court judgment will be more
apt to withstand constitutional scrutiny if the court has made a factual
finding regarding the defendant's intent to cause severe emotional distress.Y'
The effect of shifting the focus of litigation from the issue of extreme

and outrageous conduct to the issue of intent may be illustrated by reference
to Gaiters v. Lynn. 247 Loretta Lynn was sued for intentional infliction of
emotional distress by a black man whose security assignment required him
to remain in one spot at the foot of the stage throughout the defendant's

concert in the Richmond, Virginia Coliseum. At one point during the
concert, Lynn spotted Gaiters, asked him to stand, and said: "If you people

don't know what coal looks like, here is somebody who knows what coal
Black is beautiful, ain't it honey." 248 These comments
is all about ....
drew a laugh from the audience, and after the concert, the plaintiff became
the object of jokes and was called "coal miner's daughter" by his peers.249

246. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). For discussions of the
impact of the first amendment on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, see
LeBel, Emotional Distress, The First Amendment, and "This Kind of Speech'" A Heretical
Perspective on Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 60 U. Coto. L. REv. 315 (1989); Post, The
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HAgv. L. REv. 603 (1990); Smolla, Emotional Distress
and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 423 (1988);
Note, FirstAmendment Limits on Tort Liabilityfor Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional
Distress, 85 CoLUi. L. REv. 1749 (1985).
For discussions of the impact of the first amendment on civil or criminal actions for
racist or sexist speech, see K. GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE UsEs OF LANGUAGE 14157, 287-313 (1989); L. TRIE, AMERIcAN CoNSTrtrrIONAL LAW, ch. 12 (2d ed. 1988); Balkin,

Some Realism About Pluralism: Deconstructive Approaches to the First Amendment (forthcoming in DUKE L.J.); Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 1; Downs, Skokie Revisited:
Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 629 (1985); Heins,
supra note 1; Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 445 (1987);
Lawrence, When Racism Dresses in Speech's Clothing: Reconciling the First and Fourteenth
Amendments (forthcoming in DUKEa L.J.); Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Smolla, Rethinking First
Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 VASH. & LEE L. REv. 171
(1990); Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace (forthcoming); Wolman, Verbal Sexual Harassment on the Job as IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress, 17 CAP. U.L. REv. 245
(1988); Wright, Racist Speech and the FirstAmendment, 9 Miss. C.L. REv. 1 (1988); Language
as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on Group
Defamation, 37 BUFFAo L. PEv. 337 (1988/89).
247. 831 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1987).
248. Gaiters v. Lynn, 831 F.2d 51, 52 (4th Cir. 1987).
249. Id.
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The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff had failed to
allege "extreme and outrageous" conduct and dismissed the complaint.2 0
The appellate court affirmed based upon the following analysis:
Whether particular conduct arguably involving racial slurs and
innuendo meets this stringent test of outrageousness has presented
particularly difficult and sensitive questions for courts. Racial allusions do not fall per se on either side of the line. As with other
admittedly hurtful conduct, racial allusions may be found not
actionable as at worst "mere insult," or actionable as "intolerably
atrocious conduct," depending upon the context....
We are therefore left essentially to our own independent legal
judgment in freely reviewing the district court's dispositive determination....
Exercising that judgment, we agree with the district court. In
explanation, we identify the principal factors that for us tip the
scales in the direction of, at most, "mere insult"....
First, in context, the remarks, while calling attention to Gaiter's
race, particularly his blackness, are not manifestly disparaging or
demeaning of either race or color. The words spoken contained
none of the shameful, explicit racial epithets that sadly still afflict
some segments of our society and whose well understood, traditional, unmistakable purpose has been to disparage, to demean, to
humiliate and to hurt. Neither did the words in context convey the
suggestions of incompetence or inferiority sometimes evident in sly
innuendo or specific references to race or color. Indeed, the words
are as susceptible on their face to suggestions of friendly identification of speaker with subject in their common backgrounds of
hard work and humble origins, as to any attempt to disparage or
demean. And we simply cannot say that the phrase "black is
beautiful," though celebratory on its face, was converted by its
context here to the sort of mean-spirited humiliation that might be
considered an atrocious affront to accepted standards of decency.
25
[Citations omitted.] 1
Under my proposed presumption, the court would not be allowed to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff failed to allege
"extreme and outrageous conduct." That question would be preserved for
the finder of fact. The issue then would shift to the question of whether
Loretta Lynn spoke for the "purpose" of inflicting severe emotional distress
or, alternatively, knew that such distress was "substantially certain" to
result.2 2 The critical question of intent would present a question of fact

250. Id. at 53.
251. Id. at 53-54.

252. Intent under my proposal would be defined by Section 8A of the
(SEcoND)

OF TORTS

(1965).

RESTATEMENT
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that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. 253
Instead, the case would have to go to a summary judgment proceeding or
to a trial on the issue of intent.2 4 The plaintiff would be allowed to submit
evidence regarding the surrounding circumstances that would permit a
reasonable juror to find that Loretta Lynn "must have known" that her
words would cause severe emotional distress. The defendant would be
allowed to deny that she intended any harm. And the factors identified by
the appellate court, including the context in which the words were spoken,
would become relevant to the final determination of whether Loretta Lynn
had the requisite intent.
Generally speaking, in a case involving the utterance of an explicit
racial, ethnic, or religious epithet, intent will be a relatively easy issue to
resolve. In a case involving an ambiguous communication, such as the words
spoken by Loretta Lynn, intent will be a highly controverted issue, and one
that will be relatively difficult to resolveY 5 The parties will have to prove
all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the communication of the
allegedly outrageous message. In deciding the question, the trier of fact will
have to pay particularly close attention to the context in which the message
was delivered to the plaintiff.
Cases involving sexual propositions will raise particularly difficult questions regarding intent. Ordinarily, of course, the utterance of a request for
sexual intimacy will not entail an intent to cause severe emotional distress.
Rather, such a request will be spoken with an intent to initiate a sexual
relationship. Indeed, depending upon the context, repeated sexual proposi6
tions might not even evidence an intent to cause severe emotional distress.
They simply might reflect a particularly persistent desire to initiate a sexual
relationship. At some point, however, a pattern of repeated, rejected sexual
propositions will become actionable in tort.
Although it will be easier to prove intent to cause severe emotional
distress if the plaintiff can show a pattern of sexual propositions or epithets,
it should not be necessary to prove such a pattern in order to establish
liability under Section 46. Rather, if a plaintiff proves that a single sexual
proposition or epithet was communicated with intent to cause severe emotional distress, the plaintiff should be entitled to establish the remaining
7
elements of liability under Section 46.2
Cases involving the communication of pornographic messages also may
raise difficult issues regarding intent. Sometimes the defendant will have no
intent to cause severe emotional distress. For example, a manager might
give a worker a "sexually explicit" or "pornographic" gift as part of a

253. I am assuming that the issue of intent has been properly pleaded in the plaintiff's
complaint.
254. Of course, if all reasonable jurors would decide the case in the same way on the
evidence submitted, the court could enter a directed verdict on the issue of intent.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 247-51.

256. For example, the recipient may never have explicitly rejected any of the propositions.
257. See supra text accompanying note 161.
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one-time sexual proposition and claim that the gift was intended to make
the proposition more attractive. 2 8 Or a supervisor might post a picture of
a naked woman in his locker and claim that he did not intend to communicate a pornographic message to anyone. By contrast, if the supervisor
were to post the same picture on the wall in his office, a court could find
that he acted with the intent to cause severe emotional distress to any
25 9
woman subject to his supervision.
C. Severe Emotional Distress
Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress only if the plaintiff's
distress is "severe." And distress is regarded as "severe" only when the
distress is "so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure
' ' 26
it.
0 The "extreme and outrageous character" of the defendant's conduct
'26 1
is in itself "important evidence that the distress existed."
The application of these principles to actions for discriminatory speech
can best be illustrated by a sequence of cases brought by black men for
22
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc. 1
the plaintiff was a black student who returned merchandise to the defendant's store. In order to obtain a refund, he was required by the defendant's
salesman to sign a slip on which the salesman had written the following
notation: "Arrogant nigger refused exchange-says he doesn't like products. ' 263 The court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that
the defendant's conduct did not possess the "degree of severity" that is
necessary to establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 26 The case illustrates the interrelationship between the nature of
the defendant's conduct and the nature of the plaintiff's harm. One cannot
tell from reading the court's opinion whether the complaint was dismissed
due to a lack of "extreme and outrageous conduct" or due to a lack of
''severe emotional distress." The two concepts have become inextricably
intertwined in the statement of the court's holding.
In Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. 265 the plaintiff was a black man
employed as a truck driver by the defendant. The plaintiff, a member of
the Teamster's Union, told his boss that, in his capacity as shop steward,
he had told another Anbro employee that he should not drive a certain
truck to the job site. The plaintiff's boss shouted at the plaintiff in a "rude
and insolent" manner: "You goddam 'niggers' are not going to tell me

258. See Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 370 Pa. Super. 497, 536 A.2d
1375 (Pa. Super. 1988).
259. Barbetta v. Chemlawn Serv. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
260. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
261. Id.
262. 46 Ill. App. 3d 162, 360 N.E.2d 983 (1977).
263. Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc., 46 Ill. App. 3d 162, 164, 360 N.E.2d 983, 984 (1977).
264. Id. at 167, 360 N.E.2d at 986.
265. 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
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about the rules. I don't want any 'niggers' working for me. I am getting
rid of all the 'niggers'; go pick up and deliver that 8-ton roller to the other
job site and get your pay check; you're fired. '266 The defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff, as a truck driver,
"must have become accustomed to such abusive language. ' 267 In other
words, the defendant sought to avoid liability on the ground that the
plaintiff, as a tough truck driver, could not prove the fact of emotional
distress. Although the court refused to dismiss the complaint, the court did
note that the plaintiff's "susceptibility to racial slurs" would be a question
for the trier of fact. 268 Thus, in order to recover damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff in Alcorn was required to prove
that he in fact had suffered mental anguish.
The truck driver in Alcorn probably was able to prove emotional distress
at the trial because he alleged that he had become "sick and ill for several
weeks thereafter, was unable to work, and sustained shock, nausea and
insomnia." 269 But not all victims of racial discrimination who have alleged
emotional distress have sustained such resulting physical manifestations. For
example, in Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc.270 a black man was told politely
that no apartment was available, and the defendant then rented an apartment
to a white couple the very same day.2 7' The court awarded only $500 in
damages because the testimony did "not persuade" the court that the
plaintiff had sustained a legal injury for which substantial damages should
be awarded. 272 The court said that the plaintiff's inability to persuade the
court that he was entitled to substantial compensatory damages was "a
tribute to the plaintiff himself. ' 273 The judge went on to explain that the
plaintiff had taken advantage of his educational opportunities to become a
minister and that he was a "man not likely to be bowled over by a single
set-back. ' 274 The court drew an analogy to torts involving "bodily force,"
in which "a blow hard enough to injure seriously an aged or frail person
...

might be borne by a strong man with no bad effects beyond a

temporary, though painful, bruise. ' 27 The court concluded: "I think plaintiff's position in this case is that of the strong man, not that of the
weakling. "276

266. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 496-97, 468 P.2d 216, 217, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 88, 89 (1970).
267. Id. at 498-99 n.4, 468 P.2d at 219 n.4, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 91 n.4.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 497-98, 468 P.2d at 217, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
270. 110 N.J. Super. 297, 265 A.2d 404 (1970).
271. Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 302, 265 A.2d 404, 407 (1970).
272. Id.at 318, 265 A.2d at 416.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. For another case in which a black plaintiff, this time a woman, was denied a
substantial sum of money because the plaintiff was a "strong" person, see Browning v.
Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
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Thus, if a "tough" or "strong" person is the victim of discriminatory
speech, that person may well find it difficult to prove the fact of emotional
distress. Nevertheless, that person has sustained a real harm. That person
has experienced "the kind of hurt that happens on a level that can't even
produce tears, because it's much farther down than that. '277 I will call that
type of hurt "dignitary harm."
I would recommend that the concept of "severe emotional distress" be
expanded to encompass the concept of dignitary harm. I also would recommend that plaintiffs who bring intentional infliction of emotional distress
actions for "dignitary harm" be allowed and encouraged to speak in their
own voices about the nature of that very serious harm. If these recommendations are adopted, stoic victims of discriminatory speech will not be
barred automatically from recovering damages by their inability to show
that they "fell apart." Instead, judges and juries will have the opportunity
to listen to these plaintiffs empathetically and then assess damages in accord
with the very real hurt that these plaintiffs have sustained. For example, if
the black lawyer in Wiggs27T had been allowed to speak in his own voice
about the indignity of being called a "black son-of-a-bitch" in front of his
family as he was celebrating his graduation from law school and sitting for
the bar exam, he might have been able to describe the harm more accurately
than when he was confined to the language of severe emotional distress.
And if the trial court judge had heard him describe the pain that goes
deeper than tears, the judge might not have reduced the jury's total verdict
from $25,000 to $2,500 dollars. 279
CONCLUSION

In this article I have written a critique of Section 6-103 of the Model
Communicative Torts Act. Contrary to the representations of the drafters
of the Model Act, I have found that Section 6-103 is more restrictive than
the common-law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in
vindicating the rights of the victims of discriminatory speech. In particular,
the Model Act requires proof of a "pattern of communication," while tort

277. The quote is taken from an interview with Claudia Pryor, an ABC news producer
who supervised the shooting of the 1989 television documentary "Black in White America."
She was describing her reaction as she watched young black children in Atlanta take the "doll
test." The children were shown pictures of identically dressed children, one white, one black,
and they were asked to pick the pretty one, the ugly one, the clean one, the dirty one, the
smart one, the stupid one. Claudia Pryor said:
The tests deeply disturbed me .... It was the kind of hurt that happens on a level
that can't even produce tears, because it's much farther down than that. [Had I
been asked the same questions as a child,] I know I would have picked the white
girl. I'm sure I would have wanted the long, straight, blond hair. Doing this segment
made me realize how damaged I was, how damaged I am.
Carter, Black Americans Hold a TV Mirror Up To Their Life, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1989,

§ 2, at 1,col. 2.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
279. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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law allows recovery for an isolated incident of discriminatory speech.
Furthermore, the Model Act restricts the recovery of damages to plaintiffs
who were harassed on the basis of race, sex, ethnicity, or religion, while
tort law permits recovery by a broader class of victims. Therefore, as an
alternative remedy, I have recommended the codification or retention of
Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts with certain modifications
designed to ensure that Section 46 will provide adequate protection for all
victims of discriminatory speech.
My modest proposal addresses only the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. It does not consider actions for group libel, nor does it
discuss the criminal or administrative regulation of discriminatory speech.
I have chosen to focus on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress because I believe that the cause of action is well suited to vindicate
the rights of the victims of discriminatory speech.
My discussion of the historical development of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress demonstrates that courts generally are unwilling to impose tort liability for discriminatory speech until an individual
presents clear evidence that society in general disdains such speech. For
example, courts often look to the sentiments of a majority of society to
determine whether the particular insult in the case before the court constitutes sufficiently outrageous conduct under the common law. Now that the
civil rights movement has given us antidiscrimination legislation, society has
spoken with regard to its sentiments about the inappropriateness of particular types of discriminatory action. The existence of antidiscrimination
legislation can serve as a basis for the courts to tailor the cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress to meet the needs of the
victims of discriminatory speech.
I have suggested two modifications of existing tort law. First, I have
recommended the recognition of a rebuttable presumption that certain
categories of discriminatory speech constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. Specifically, such a presumption would arise whenever a member of
a group protected by existing antidiscrimination legislation claims that he
or she verbally was harassed or abused on the basis of membership in that
group. The adoption of this proposal would make it easier for members of
minority groups to recover damages under the majoritarian test of "outrageousness." It also would put the spotlight on the issue of intent. Second,
I have proposed that the concept of "severe emotional distress" be expanded
to encompass the concept of dignitary harm. The adoption of this proposal
would allow even the stoic victims of discriminatory speech to recover
damages for the hurt that they have experienced.
I have not addressed the first amendment issues raised by my proposal.
That is a topic for another article. Fortunately, Professor Smolla has written
a piece for this Symposium on the constitutionality of regulating racist and
sexist speech. I believe that my proposal is consistent with the guidelines
set forth in the conclusion of Professor Smolla's article.

